The 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron during the Battle of the Bulge

The 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron

during the Battle of the Bulge

This document was transcribed by Roy W. Boylan, nephew of the late Colonel Vincent L. Boylan (1913-1983). Vincent L. Boylan was the Commanding Officer of the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized from March 1943 through July 1945. The information here was transcribed from materials obtained from the World War II Records Division of the National Archives. This information was obtained by Mr. Robert F. Porecca, son of the late T/4 Sgt. Frank D. Porecca of the Squadron.

The quality of the original is poor and some information is missing or possibly transcribed incorrectly. The reports have been transcribed “as is” although some obvious spelling errors have been marked with “(sic)”. Bob Porecca and I look forward to hearing from any veterans of the unit or their relatives or anyone interested in this material. Complete 49 page document is available to anyone who contacts Bob Porecca or Roy Boylan.

Robert Porecca can be reached at:

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Roy Boylan can be reached at: Roy W. Boylan, 8903 NE 25th Ave. Vancouver, Washington 98665

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UNIT HISTORY

A. 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized

B. Changes in Organization.

The 87th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion was redesigned the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized on 20 September 1943, per paragraph 2, General Order Number 36, Headquarters Seventh Armored Division, dated 20 September 1943. Pursuant to the above General Order, the following changes were made: The Reconnaissance Company of the 31st Armored Regiment was assigned to the Squadron and designated Troop “D”. The Reconnaissance Company of the 40th Armored Regiment was assigned to the Squadron and designated Troop “E”, (Assault Gun) Troop of the Squadron. The Light Tank Company of the Battalion was redesigned as Company “F” in the Squadron.

D. Stations (Permanent or Temporary), of Unit or parts thereof.

The 87th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion departed from North Camp Polk, Louisiana on 12 March 1943, and arrived at Camp Coxcomb (Desert Training Center), California, 15 March 1943. The Battalion departed from Camp Coxcomb California, 6 August 1943, and arrived at Fort Benning, Georgia, 11 August 1943. On 5 September, 1943 Companies “A” and “C” departed Fort Benning, Georgia, for Barnwell and Aiken, South Carolina, respectively, to organize and operate temporary Prisoner of War Camps for German Prisoners engaged in the harvesting of peanuts. These units returned to Fort Benning, Georgia, 8 October 1943. Major Charles A. Cannon, Jr., 0-23835, Squadron Executive Officer, was in command of these detachments.

Summary.

1. From 1 January 1943 to 12 March 1943, the 87th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion was stationed at North Camp Polk, Louisiana. On 12 March 1943, the 87th Armored Reconnaissance Battalion as part of the Seventh Armored Division, moved to Camp Coxcomb, California, the Desert Training Center for Desert Training. On 16 March, 1943, orders were received transferring the Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel John H. Claybrook, 0-15817, to Armored Force Headquarters, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) Vincent L. Boylan, 0-22163, assumed command of the Battalion. The period 12 March to 16 July 1943, was devoted to training in cross-country driving, night driving, small unit training and combat firing problems. As prescribed by Army Ground Force Headquarters, the last eleven days of this period were spent in an eleven day problem (maneuver). The period 17 July to 5 August, was spent in maintenance and preparation for movement to Fort Benning, Georgia. The period 15 August to 15 September 1943, was devoted to small unit training and preparation for, and range firing. On 15 November 1943, the Squadron as part of the Division, moved to the field for one month. Range firing was continued during this period and preparation was made for various tests of parts of the Squadron and for the Squadron test which was conducted by Third Corps on the fourth and fifth of December.

2. On 2 August 1943, while stationed in the Desert, an orchestra was formed by members of the Battalion. The orchestra has improved steadily and has been enhanced by the addition of new instruments and additional members and is now one of which the entire Squadron is proud.

3. On 15October 1943 a squadron newspaper was organized and published under the title, “RECON REPORTER”. This paper is published on the 15th of every month. The title of the paper was chosen as the result of an interesting contest.

For the Squadron Commander:

FRED M. LAMBDIN 2nd Lt,

87th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Adjutant

HEADQUARTERS 87th CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON MECHANIZED

A.P.O. #257, C/O POSTMASTER. NEW YORK, NEW YORK

8 January, 1945

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Month of December, 1944

To: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C. (Through Channels)

From 1 December to 15 December 1944, Troop D was attached to CCA and Troop B to CCB. Squadron CP, Headquarters and Service Troop and Company F were located at Palemig, Holland, with Troop C at Kakert and Troop A in Nieuenhagen. The Squadron Commander and his staff were studying the Division plan for crossing of Ruhr River, and troops were carrying on maintenance and training. Special emphasis was placed on use of mortars and other weapons, beginning with individual and crew training, and culminating in platoon combat firing problems.

15 December 1944 at 1000, Troop B returned to Squadron control, and at 1800 closed in bivouac near Squadron Headquarters in the outskirts of Heerlen. It was understood that Troop D would also be returned, but at 1645 on the 16th an order was received to cease all movement, and be on a one-hour alert for movement after 0800 next morning. At about 2000 the evening of the 16th the Squadron was ordered to be prepared for movement South any time after 2400. No further details were known until the liaison officer arrived with march order, which called for crossing the IP at Kunrade at 0330, and marching to Vielsalm, Belgium. A billeting officer was sent ahead, and with the time for crossing the IP pushed back one hour, the squadron crossed and cleared promptly, marching under radio silence.

At Vielsalm the billeting officer designated an assembly area to the East, including Poteau and Recht, and the latter was selected for a temporary CP. The head of the Squadron column arrived there at 1030 on the morning of the 17th, and by 1200 the CP was set up. Troop B had pushed on through to the East, Troop C blocked approaches from the North, and Troops A and D were held in readiness along the road to the West. Radio nets were opened, and orders received for the Commanding Officer to report to Headquarters CCB at St. Vith for orders . In the absence of Lieutenant Colonel BOYLAN who was then on leave, the Executive Officer, Major CANNON, reported to the Commanding General, and was notified that the Squadron less Troop B was attached to CCB, and that Troop B was detached from the Squadron and placed directly under CCB control. Squadron (-) was ordered to form a screen from the Schoenberg road up to the Heppenbach road, pushing well out so as to include Meyerode, Herresbach, and Heuem. The plan put out to the Troop Commanders at Recht called for the three Reconnaissance troops in line with the Tank Company in reserve. Company F was then sent to Medell to reconnoitre and outpost the town for use as Squadron CP, but found the town already occupied by the enemy. Consequently the Squadron CP was set up in a field one mile West of St. Vith, Company F furnishing security. Troops A and D pushed out to occupy their assigned zones, but were held up by friendly traffic. Troop C was diverted to the North to counter a ??? threat, and occupied the ridge-line running generally East from Hunningen, then South with a roadblock on the Heppenbach road. The Troop tied in with the 38th Infantry at this point, and Troop A which had pushed on ahead and discovered that the enemy was in Wallerode withdrew behind this roadblock at about one o’clock next morning.

At approximately 0300 an order was received to attach one troop to each combat command, and Troops A and D were attached to CCR and CCA respectively. However, since it was impossible for Troop A to reach CCR’s position, the Commanding General, CCB, later obtained permission to continue using Troop A in his sector.

At dawn, 40 or 50 German infantryman (sic) attacked the 3rd platoon of Troop C, on the ridge East of Hunningen. A firefight ensued, and the enemy was reinforced by more infantry supported by tanks. The 3rd platoon fell back on Hunningen, and as the enemy pushed on to the crossroads, Sergeant Norbert H. Zimmerman took part of the 1st platoon and set up on the high ground 300 yards Southwest of the town, while the remainder of the platoon with the Troop Headquarters and 3rd platoon retired about 400 yards along the road to St. Vith, and set up a defensive position behind buildings along the road. Later these elements fell back about 300 yards farther and established a line on high ground astride the road.

From the high ground near Hunningen, enemy tanks threatened the Squadron CP to the South of them, and the CP moved West to a point just short of Rodt, where word was received that the enemy was in Recht and Poteau, having thus cut the road to Vielsalm.

At 1000 the Troop C line was reinforced by a platoon of light tanks from Company F, commanded by Lieutenant GOOD, and at 1100 a company of mediums from the 31st arrived. These tanks drove back the enemy tanks, and when a company of Tank Destroyers arrived about noon, the mediums left to undertake a new mission East of St. Vith.

Shortly after noon, Lieutenant Colonel BOYLAN arrived at the Squadron CP and resumed command of the Squadron. He was ordered to coordinate with Lieutenant Colonel ERLENBUSCH in organizing the defense of the North flank.

The Tank Destroyers which arrived to support Troop C had the mission of retaking the high ground around Hunningen, and after a coordinated attack Troop C reestablished the old line through Hunningen with Tank Destroyers in support. Four 40mm Anti-tank guns were also moved up in support, plus a 105mm Self-propelled howitzer and a platoon from the 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion that happened to be occupying a position nearby. By 1800 however, only C/87 was left, and about this time Company C 31st Tank Battalion arrived and moved in on the left (West) flank.

Meanwhile, Troop A had taken over the position formerly occupied by the 2nd platoon of Troop C, and Troop D had moved out to the vicinity of Thommen to join CCA. A change of orders placed Troop D directly under Division control, and Lieutenant OLSON went to Division Headquarters, to be followed by the troop in the morning. This left Troops C and A holding a line along the ridge-line East out of Hunningen and South to the Heppenbach road, tied in with A/38 on their right and C/31on their left.

The following day, 19 December, the Squadron CP moved to the crossroads one kilometer Southwest of Rodt. 1st Platoon Company F made a road reconnaissance West of Rodt toward Vielsalm, and reported that although there was a trail leading West from Hinterhausen to Commanster, the only satisfactory and serviceable road was through Krombach. The 2nd platoon Company F set up roadblocks in Ober Emmels, while the 3rd platoon remained in support of Troop C. One platoon from the 814 Tank Destroyer Battalion was also in support of Troop C. (See overlay for 19 December, 1944, Page 6)

During the night considerable vehicular movement was heard. Numerous artillery concentrations were fired on located enemy positions, and enemy vehicles and men threatened the line several times but were driven back by artillery and small arms.

The afternoon of the 20th, A/17 came South from Recht through Ober Emmels, and was placed in position on the left flank of C/31, with Lieutenant WAMSTAD’s platoon (2F/87) still out in front, outposting Ober Emmels.

To further extend and protect the left flank, Captain STINE was sent with his Tank company headquarters, one platoon from D/31, and one platoon from C/23. This small force was tied in on the left flank of A/17, which was supported by a platoon plus two squads from C/23 and tied in on the right with five tanks from C/31. Those in turn were tied in with C/87 which was supported by one platoon from F/87 and one platoon 814 Tank Destroyer, and tied in to Troop A. The right flank of Troop A tied in with A/38.

Early in the evening, just toward dusk, enemy activity increased all along the line, with the main attack coming in the Troop C sector. This attack was repulsed with Tank Destroyers, and Troop C reported three enemy tanks knocked out, one probable. In the morning, four enemy tanks (MK IV) were found knocked out. These dispositions remained unchanged through the 21st, and with the aid of excellent artillery support numerous enemy attacks were repulsed.

During the morning of the 21st, a large enemy patrol estimated at 300 men penetrated in the CCA sector, cutting the road between Headquarters CCA and Headquarters 48th Armored Infantry Battalion. Later, dismounted enemy, presumably the same, threatened the 275th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, in Hinterhausen. Lieutenant BARNHILL was sent out with his light tank platoon (3F/87) at dusk, to drive off this enemy force and destroy them if possible. This mission he accomplished, but some enemy escaped and contributed a feeling of insecurity in all the area around Hinterhausen.

Again the enemy was especially active at night, and there were numerous enemy thrusts in the vicinity of Neder Emmels and Ober Emmels. While the 23rd and 38th Armored Infantry Battalions were reorganizing in the triangle Krombach – Hinterhausen – Rodt, the enemy seriously threatened the left flank West of Captain STINE’s position. Some enemy even penetrated the lines and established a roadblock 400 yards East of Rodt on the road to St. Vith. However, in the morning the lines appeared to be intact.

Early in the morning, enemy men and vehicles were reported in St. Vith, and around ten o’clock a serious threat developed along the left flank. By 1030 this threat was so serious that the Squadron Commander ordered the CP to move to Krombach. This was done immediately, but not before the enemy had brought the Hinterhausen Road under fire and dismounted enemy troops had closed in to within 200 yards of the CP. Then with all Headquarters personnel firing every available weapon, the Squadron Headquarters moved by a back trail generally South then West to Krombach, where another temporary CP was established.

At this time orders were received to form a line North and East of Krombach and Hinterhausen. Troops C and A were detached Squadron control and moved crosscountry to the high ground Southwest of St. Vith under command of Lieutenant Colonel ERLENBUSCH; the remainder of the troops from the left flank fought their way back to Hinterhausen, and set up a defensive position facing North and East, under command of Lieutenant Colonel BOYLAN. Here a task force was organized under command of Captain STINE, consisting of A/17, one company S14 Tank Destroyer (less 1 platoon), the remaining tanks of F/87, and one assault gun from E/87.

At 1843, a radio message from Troop C (which was no longer under Squadron control) warned of an enemy tank moving into Krombach along the railroad tracks. Subsequent reports indicated more tanks and infantry approaching South of the railroad. TD’s were placed to counter this threat, and additional guards alerted. Shortly before 2100 the guards reported enemy infantry closing in on the town, and at 2100 the headquarters moved out, setting up in Maldingen at 0045.

At daybreak 23 December, Squadron Headquarters moved from Maldingen to Commanster, withdrawal having been ordered along the route Commanster—Vielsalm. From this point the Squadron Commander pushed out toward Hinterhausen to take personal command of the covering force there. He intercepted the withdrawing covering force midway between Hinterhausen and Commmanster, and set up a defensive position to the North and Northeast of Commanster to protect the withdrawal of CCB as per instructions Commanding General CCB. It was there discovered that the medium tank company commander had lost control of a platoon of medium tanks and 3 TD’s, which had left Hinterhausen, tied on to the main column, and accompanied the withdrawal, thus materially weakening the fighting strength of the force at hand.

The withdrawal from Commanster was accomplished rapidly and in perfect order, Squadron Headquarters falling in on the tail of the CCB column. Upon receipt of notice that all troops had successfully withdrawn from Commanster, the order was given for the covering force to withdraw to the next defensive position.

As the head of the rear guard column reached Commanster, word was received that the main column was held up, and further delaying action would be necessary, A defensive position was immediately set up in Commanster. This position was held against an enemy attack in which two medium tanks and one Tank Destroyer were lost. Orders were then received to continue the withdrawal.

A successful orderly disengagement was effected, and the task force marched in column on Vielsalm. At a point 2.6 miles East of Vielsalm, friendly troops from the 28th Infantry Division were encountered, and the column stopped to ascertain what remained between Vielsalm and Commanster. The Sergeant in charge of the infantrymen stated that his two machine gun squads were all that remained.

Major CANNON then returned, having seen the tail of the main column clear over the bridge into Vielsalm, and in compliance with orders he deployed the taskforce in another defensive position. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel BOYLAN returned to Vielsalm for instructions. Upon arrival, he found that Division Headquarters was still in Vielsalm with nothing between them and the enemy but the small rear guard and two infantry machine gun squads. He radioed orders to hold in place, and made a reconnaissance to Salmchateau, where it was found that the enemy had entered the outskirts of town and knocked out a friendly vehicle with bazooka fire. Accordingly, upon his return to the covering force, Lieutenant Colonel BOYLAN detached one platoon of light tanks and sent them to protect the South flank and to keep the axis of withdrawal open. At the same time, a reconnaissance section under Lieutenant GLORIOSO was sent back East toward Commanster to regain contact. The road led through heavily wooded, hilly country, and all movement was canalized. The section drew fire, returned it, and was forced back, withdrawing through the defensive position. Numerous artillery concentrations were fired to hold off the advancing enemy, one concentration falling on the friendly position and causing four casualties. By 1900, however, this position had become completely untenable, since the enemy was within a mile of Vielsalm on both the North and South. To avoid being cut off by these enemy forces, the task force withdrew to a defensive position in the outskirts of Vielsalm, where orders were received to withdraw to the assigned area. A reconnaissance was made North and South of the bridge, but no friendly troops remained, the infantry having withdrawn. The withdrawal was then effected, the task force commander remaining on the East side of the bridge and counting the vehicles as they crossed. When his own vehicle crossed at 1925, the force commander reported to the 82nd Airborne Division engineers at the bridge that the last friendly vehicle had crossed.

Meanwhile, the remnants of the Squadron had assembled in the assigned area at Jevigne, moved from there to join Squadron Trains 4 miles South of Harze, and from there moved to the new assembly area vicinity Xhignesse, closing in at 2200. There they were later joined by the Squadron Commander and Executive Officer, with those elements of the squadron which had been a part of the covering force, plus supply and medical crews which had been sent out to support that force.

It should be noted that the weather was a strong factor in the successful withdrawal of our forces. A quick freeze during the night 22 – 23 December had made the road from Hinderhausen to Commanster capable of holding Division load. A sudden thaw could have had disastrous results.

The morning of the 24th, Lieutenant Colonel DAMON of the 14th Cavalry Group arrived with orders that elements of his group (which included the 18th and 32d (sic) Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons) were to be used by Lieutenant Colonel BOYLAN in a temporary reorganization of the 87th. Provisional Troop A was immediately incorporated in place of B/87, while Troops A and B of the 87th were combined to bring Troop A up to fighting strength in men and vehicles, and Troops C and D were combined to make a reorganized Troop C. At 1352 the Squadron moved out to outpost the CCB Zone to the Southwest along the line Manhay, Grandmenil, Erezee, Barvaux. This line was occupied as ordered with Troop C on the East, Troop A in the center, and B to the West. Squadron CP was established at La Beole.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel DAMON concentrated his troops in Xhignesse and undertook to organize two T/O rcn troops to replace Troops B and D of the 87th. He sent a light tank company and one rcn troop that same night, and the following evening another rcn troop, almost complete, arrived. On 26 December the reorganization was completed as follows:

ORIGINAL UNIT NEW UNIT COMMANDING OFFICER

TR A & B/87 Tr "A" Captain WELLS

TR C/32 Tr "B" Captain MARTIN

TRS C & D/87 Tr "C" Captain JOHNSON

Tr B/32 Tr "D" Captain LINDSEY

Tr E/87 Tr "E" Lt WILLOUGHBY

Co F/18 & F/87 Tr "F" Captain STINE

At 1600, per VOCG CCB, Troop D plus 1 platoon Company F was attached to the 38 Armored Infantry Battalion, and Troop B plus 1 platoon Company F was attached to the 424th Infantry Regiment. The remainder of the Squadron continued outposting the CCB zone to the Southwest.

This situation generally remained the same for four days, until the night of 29 – 30 December, when the Division was relieved and ordered to move to a new assembly area. At 0530 the Squadron column crossed its IP and moved by way of Bomal to Xhoris. Finding the Squadron Headquarters area filled with Corps and Army troops, permission was obtained to place the Squadron CP in the CCA area at Comblain-la-Tour. All men and vehicles from the 14th Cavalry Group reverted to their own unit control and proceeded directly to their own assembly area in the vicinity of Oneux. Troop A (A & B) was billeted in Pierreux, Troop C (C & D) in Xhoris, and the following day the attached assault gun platoons reverted to Troop control and closed in the Troop E assembly area at Comblinay.

At the close of the month, the Squadron was perfecting the organization of two full-strength reconnaissance troops with assault gun attachments. The Tank Company was reduced to six tanks, during this reorganization, emphasis was placed on maintenance and supply problems, with the objective of regaining combat efficiency without delay.

VINCENT L. BOYLAN

Lieutenant Colonel,

Cavalry Commanding

HEADQUARTERS 87th CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON MECHANIZED

A.P.O. #257, C/O POSTMASTER NEW YORK, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Month of January, 1945

To: The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C. (Through Channels)

At the beginning of the month the Squadron CP was in Comblain-la-Tour, Belgium, with Troop C and D, and Company F in Xhoris, Troops A and B at the road junction just North of Xhoris, and Troop E in Comblinay. The next day, one platoon from Company F was detached and placed on Detached Service with Division Headquarters, taking five tanks. The remainder of the company with the one remaining tank then moved to Comblain-la-Tour, where they furnished security for Squadron Headquarters.

Troops B and D and Company F had emerged from the St. Vith action far below strength in both men and vehicles. Therefore, during the first ten days in January emphasis was on reorganization, maintenance, and resupply. Several old men returned to duty, including experienced non-commissioned officers and one officer. Each day the unit regained more of it’s (sic) combat efficiency.

As more and more snow fell, chains were put on all vehicles and experiments were conducted with winter camouflage for vehicles. Then, 11 January 1945, all radios were silenced, and on 12 January the Squadron moved to a new assembly area with the CP located at Oneux, Belgium. The assault gun platoons were attached to the troops and moved with them. The area was crowded and the troops were scattered out with A in Spa, C in Sassor, B and D in Theux, and headquarters and service about four miles west of Theux.

The Squadron was attached to CCR for the forthcoming operation, an attack to retake St. Vith. The Squadron mission was to reconnoiter to the South and East after the town was taken, but the attack went much more slowly than expected. By the time the order came to move from this assembly area, Troops A, C, and D were sufficiently reinforced and re-equipped to operate as normal reconnaissance troops.

On 20 January, 1945, radio silence was lifted and the Squadron moved on order Commanding Officer CCR to Ceckaphange. Heavy snow blocked secondary roads, and made it necessary to go by the MSR through Spa. All troops had closed in the new assembly area by noon.

The following day brought another move. This time Headquarters and Service Troop and Trains remained in place, while the Squadron Headquarters and Company F moved to Waimes, Troops A, C and D to Bruyeres, and troop B to Walk.

// at least one line is cut off.// …a secondary defensive line running generally northeast (cutoff) outposting Iveldingen and Montenau to the southeast, in support of the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Headquarters and Troop A moved to Montenau, C and D to Iveldingen, B remained in Walk, and Trains moved to Xhoffraix. Troops C and A prepared defensive positions southeast of the towns, while Troop D reconnoitered the high ground around Montenau for artillery OP’s and firing positions. All three troops were preparing plans for dismounted employment against the town of St. Vith.

Considerable enemy artillery fell in the assembly area, but there were few casualties. Then, that same night, Troops A and C were given missions to reconnoiter out from St. Vith to the east and south respectively. The town had been reduced to a heap of rubble by bombs and shells, and amounted to a huge roadblock rather than a communications center. The patrols proceeded through town dismounted, and a patrol from Troop C, led by Lieutenant JOHN H. MULLIKEN, JR., penetrated southeast to about 860867 from which point they heard German conversation and motor sounds to the East. These patrols were recalled at midnight.

On the 24th, Troop C had the mission of making a reconnaissance in force of the high ground north of Galhausen and Neidingen , this high ground being the Division objective for the 25th. At 1145 the troop moved out from the assembly area to a dismount point just north of St. Vith, where one man was killed by a hedgerow booby trap. The troop marched through town single file, with the 3rd Platoon in the lead, followed by the 1st and 2nd. Troop A moved up to a dismount point behind them, prepared to support.

The Troop C column worked its way along the road directly South out of St. Vith to the railroad, then since one of the bridges was blown, detoured West to a place where the railroad cut presented a less difficult obstacle to cross. The point, consisting of Lt. MILLIKEN, one radio man, one BAR man, and one rifleman, had pushed beyond the high ground at 853869 and was in plain sight of the objective when the enemy opened flanking fire with machine guns and rifles from houses and fox-holes along the road to the West. The 3rd and 1st Platoons opened fire with machine guns and rifles, killed three, wounded three, and captured eleven. The remainder escaped south along the road.

After observing for some time the enemy on the objective in front of them, the point opened fire to further test the enemy strength (estimated at from 25 to 40 infantrymen, and from two to five tanks or SP guns). The enemy replied with machine guns and 20mm, and mortar, nebelwerfer, and light artillery began to come in from the east. The point fell back a little, but the high ground was held.

Later the 509th PIB was supposed to pass through this position and attack. They were guided through, and the troop dug in to hold the high ground at 853869 with reserves along the railroad. The men had no blankets, and had to be rotated, giving them a chance to warm up in a cellar back of the railroad tracks. Total casualties so far were one killed (booby trap) and eight wounded by artillery fire.

Meanwhile, Troop D had been attached to CCB at 1400, and Troop A had come under direct control of CCR at 2100. Troop B moved to the vicinity of Am Kreuz under CCR control, and Squadron Trains moved to Waimes.

25 January 1945 at 1325, Troop C passed to tactical control of Task Force Erlenbusch, with orders to attack south at 1430 and seize the high ground facing them. The attack was postponed one hour and then jumped off with planned artillery fires on the objective.

Troop C had three platoons abreast, all west of the St. Vith - Galhausen road, and the 509th PIB was proceeding directly down that road on their left. As the attack moved forward, the 2nd and 3rd platoons were taken under fire by friendly tanks west of St. Vith (using HE and Coaxial machine guns), and from the high ground to the east the enemy laid mortar and artillery on them in the open fields in front of the objectives. The 1st and 3rd platoons, followed by the 509th, pushed through this friendly and enemy fire, placing marching fire on the objective all the way. The objective was also smoked.

Upon reaching the high ground the friendly artillery lifted, the 509th fanned out to the left, and the enemy fled. The 1st and 3rd platoons pursued the enemy, overran the objective, and had to be called back.

The 2nd Platoon was delayed by the intense friendly fire, but later pushed down to the woods South of Mailust. The 1st and 3rd Platoons established a line along the high ground from 852864 to 853863, where they tied in with the 509th. This line was held until relieved on the 27th.

The men had one blanket the first night, and two the second, but about 15 had to be evacuated for frostbite and trenchfoot. The spirit of these men was splendid. They stuck in the line, and even when foot inspections revealed frostbite it took a direct order to get them out.

Also noteworthy was the manner in which pack trains were organized by Lieutenant FRED A. LEWELLAN and Sgt. John R. Lubin, using practically all the men not actually in the line, including vehicle guards, maintenance men, cooks and supply personnel, to carry supplies up to the men in the line. Drinking water presented a difficult problem because it froze in the canteens and water cans, and the meat or eggs in the K rations froze hard. Observed enemy artillery fire from the East made it necessary for supplies to move under cover of darkness or by a defiladed route through deep snow. Despite these difficulties the functions of supply and evacuation were carried out.

At about 0300 on the 26th, the Squadron Commander returned from Division Headquarters with a special mission. Troop A returned to Squadron control in the vicinity of Montenau, and the Troop Commander, Captain ROLLAND R. SMITH with the troop executive officer, Lieutenant LEE A. MESTAS were ordered to report to the Squadron CP immediately. A staff meeting was held with these two officers to plan the operation, which was to consist of three fifteen-man dismounted patrols pushing out from Meyerode to the east. Objectives were designated as shown on sketch, and patrols A,B, and C were to reconnoiter to Oak, Pine and Birch respectively awaiting orders there before pushing on to Maple, Poplar, and Elm. It was anticipated that these patrols would remain behind the enemy lines two nights, maintaining contact by radio and reporting all enemy activity observed.

In the morning Troop A organized to transport patrols from Montenau with minimum transportation. A route was reconnoitered, and at 1145 the column left Montenau using armored cars with extra men riding on the outside. The road into Meyerode was exposed, and the enemy brought down accurate observed fire from mortars and artillery and direct fire from at least one piece (believed to be an SP gun), killing one man and wounding another. Arriving in Meyerode at 1330, the vehicles were dispersed and the patrols reorganized. Each patrol had one radio SCR 300, and most of the men had snowsuits.

Patrol A, led by Lieutenant VINCENT L. HEINTZELMAN, set out at 1400, following the road to the northwest from town for a distance of approximately 600 yards, then turning northeast across the open snow toward the woods. Patrol B, led by Lieutenant EDWARD C. GITS, left fifteen minutes later and followed the northeast road to the edge of town where the infantry had one heavy machine gun. Beyond this point the road and area around it was freshly shell-pocked, and the infantry stated that it was under direct observation. Noticing the hill on the left, it was decided to use it as a screen, and the patrol went back and found another road on the other (north) side of the crest, screened from the woods to the south. This sunken road with thick hedgerows afforded cover and concealment to the top of the hill, and there at the crossroads Patrol B met Patrol A. The two patrols exchanged information, and Patrol A continued directly toward the woods to the northeast while Patrol B sent two scouts down the trail to the southeast to observe the woods in that direction. They saw two Germans follow the same trail into the woods, and reported back in time to notify the last man in Lieutenant HEINTZELMAN’S patrol. Remaining in observation, a total of fourteen enemy were seen in the edge of the woods, and one machine gun was spotted where the trail entered the woods at 905937.

About this time, Patrol C, commanded by Lieutenant ROBERT F. McGONIGAL, arrived by the same route. After an exchange of information, both patrols remained in observation and saw two enemy patrols (one of four or five men, the other six) apparently following Patrol A into the woods. Efforts were made to warn Lieutenant HEINTZELMAN by radio, but without success. Meanwhile Patrol A had pushed into the wood, crossing a well-beaten trail which ran along the edge. The woods were so dense that radio contact was lost almost immediately after entering, and the patrol pushed on to Oak, arriving after dark. There they put a long antenna on the radio, but although contact was established communication was impossible, the signals being unreadable both ways. The snow in the woods was unbroken, there was no sign of enemy in the area, and no observation from that point, so the patrol proceeded back by a different route attempting to establish communications and get orders. Communication could not be re-established until after the enemy trail along the woods had been re-crossed. Permission was then received to return to the Troop CP in Meyerode, where the patrol arrived at about 0300.

Patrols B and C had remained in observation until dark, observing enemy activity for 180 degrees from the town of Ades B (89594 ??) around the perimeter of the woods where the enemy machine gun was located. Friendly artillery dropped in all around their OP, but no casualties were suffered. At dark, the patrols returned to the Troop CP, reported what they had seen, and after warming up for a half hour started out again.

This time, on the advice of the C. O. 3rd Battalion 424th Infantry Regiment, the patrol took a trail leading directly east from the south part of Meyerode(see overlay attached). As the trail appeared to have been used by the enemy, it appeared wiser to turn off before the trail entered the woods. A small path was discovered leading southeast into the woods, and since the pines at this point were too thick to penetrate the patrol followed this path for about 500 yards, where the path disappeared. The snow on the path was drifted thigh deep, and was unbroken. Nobody had been through it since the snowfall. The path followed along the north path of a stream, and when it faded out the patrol climbed east up the hill into the woods, then turned south to the edge of the clearing. There was a full moon, but the patrol was concealed in the trees. Then someone betrayed their position by coughing, and two machine guns – a MG42 and a caliber .30 light – opened up from the south side of the clearing, firing up the trail toward the patrol’s position. By this time the men were cold and nearly exhausted from pushing through the deep snow, and the largeness of the patrols made them difficult to control in the presence of the enemy, so they returned by the same route, arriving at the Troop CP at about 0230.

The following morning (27 January 45) at daylight, Patrol A followed the same road followed by Patrols B and C the afternoon before, to the CP at the crossroads approximately 600 yards north of Meyerode. From this point enemy were still sighted between the two villages to the northwest and north, and at the machine-gun position to the southeast. While the second section remained on the hill observing to the north, the first section proceeded cautiously down the trail to within 150 yards of the enemy machine gun. From this point they observed twelve Germans walking around the machine gun position without arms. One had a cane, only two had snow suits. Apparently they had a shelter back in the woods, for they changed reliefs on the machine gun, the reliefs coming and going by the trail into the woods. Every half-hour a single round of friendly artillery passed over the patrol and landed near the enemy position, then at about noon ten rounds came in – two landing on the enemy position, and eight around the patrol. Soon after, the patrol assembled and returned to the CP by the same route.

The same morning, Patrols B and C started out to the West of Meyerode, and then swung south. Just east of Medell they ran into active fighting, and were unable to get through unobserved. (Friendly troops said the enemy had just launched a small counterattack.) On the way back they again swung west of the Medell-Meyerode road which was still under enemy observation and fire. As they came around the hill they received enemy artillery fire at 893932 and suffered four casualties – two serious, two light. They reached town shortly after noon.

The plan for the evening of the 27th called for all three patrols to proceed to Oak, from which point Patrol A was to reconnoiter through Maple, Poplar, and Elm, Patrol B south between Maple and Oak, and Patrol C through Pine, Birch and Spruce. All patrols were to return by 280030.

At 1745 Patrol A started out to the North. About 200 yards from the CO they met three Germans without arms, one of them waving a white flag. These were brought back to the CP, and upon questioning turned out to be from the 404th Volksgrenadier Division. They said that at the point where the patrols had previously located one enemy machine gun there were in fact three, each manned by three men.

The patrol then set out again and proceeded to the crossroads OP north of town, where a radio relay station was established. The moon was full but there were some clouds, and while the moon was hidden the patrol followed its own old tracks across the snow toward Oak, followed by Patrols B and C. As they crossed the enemy trail at the edge of the woods they came under friendly artillery fire, but they pushed on through. 300 yards short of Oak, however, a heavier concentration of friendly artillery came in all around and ahead of them. They radioed back through the relay station and drew back out of the artillery fire. Here they were again shelled, and drew back to the relay station, where they radioed for orders. Instructions were to remain there and direct fire on the enemy machine guns at 905937, which they did. However, they could get only twelve rounds, of which about ten were in the target area. More was requested but refused. (Next day about fifty dead Germans were found around this spot.)

The patrols then turned back, arriving at the Troop CP at 280020. At noon they left Meyerode to return to the troop assembly area at Montenau.

When Troop D was first attached to CCB they had been given the mission of holding St. Vith from the East, but later they were shifted south to relieve the 509th PIB on the east flank of Troop C. Both troops were released on the evening of the 27th, and on the morning of the 28th Squadron moved out on the march to the new assembly area. Head of column crossed the IP (Ligneuville) at 1100 and marched to the vicinity of Limbourg, Belgium, closing in at 1811. The Squadron CP, headquarters and Service Troop, and Troop A were located in Bilstain, Troops B and C in Limbourg, Troop C in Chemins, Troop D in Houyeux, and Company F in Houtem.

The remainder of the month was spent on maintenance, reorganization, and resuply.

VINCENT L. BOYLAN

Lt. Colonel, Cavalry

Commanding

Robert F. PORECCA and Roy W. BOYLAN,

nephew of Col. Vincent I. BOYLAN

87th Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squadron

7th Armored Division

Campaigns

Battle of the Bulge,

Belgium